According to Lee, there are two key factors that will soon bring more institutional interest to the markets. First, it will be the upcoming launch of the digital assets platform Bakkt by the operator of major global exchange New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). Announced in August this year, Bakkt recently confirmed a “target” launch date for Jan. 24, 2019.
One mitigation strategy has been the introduction of trading curbs, also known as "circuit breakers", which are a trading halt in the cash market and the corresponding trading halt in the derivative markets triggered by the halt in the cash market, all of which are affected based on substantial movements in a broad market indicator. Since their inception, circuit breakers have been modified to prevent both speculative gains and dramatic losses within a small time frame.
But what about the risk of a property price crash as suggested by the recent Sixty Minutes report? Several things are worth noting in relation to this: predictions of a 30-50% property price crash have been wheeled out regularly in Australian media over the last decade including on Sixty Minutes; the anecdotes of mortgage stress and defaults don’t line up well with actual data showing low levels of arrears; borrowers have already been moving from interest only to principle and interest loans over the last few years, without a lot of stress; and the 40-45% price fall call on the program was “if everything turns against us”. Our view remains that in the absence of much higher interest rates, much higher unemployment, or a multi-year supply surge (none of which are expected) a property crash is unlikely. But the risks are now greater than when property crash calls started to be made a decade or so ago and so deeper price falls than the 15% top to bottom fall we expect for Sydney and Melbourne are a high risk. This is particularly so given the risk that post the Royal Commission bank lending standards become excessively tight, negative gearing is restricted and the capital gains tax discount is halved after a change in government in Canberra. There is also a big risk that FOMO (fear of missing out) becomes FONGO (fear of not getting out) for some.
The crucial point of their paper was that sandpile avalanches could not be predicted, and not because of randomness (there was no random component in their model) or because the authors could not figure out how to come up with equations to describe it. Rather, they found it impossible in a fundamental sense to set up equations that would describe the sandpile model analytically, so there was no way to predict what the sandpile would do. The only way to observe its behavior was to set up the model in a computer and let it run.
No definitive conclusions have been reached on the reasons behind the 1987 Crash. Stocks had been in a multi-year bull run and market P/E ratios in the U.S. were above the post-war average. The S&P 500 was trading at 23 times earnings, a postwar high and well above the average of 14.5 times earnings. Herd behavior and psychological feedback loops play a critical part in all stock market crashes but analysts have also tried to look for external triggering events. Aside from the general worries of stock market overvaluation, blame for the collapse has been apportioned to such factors as program trading, portfolio insurance and derivatives, and prior news of worsening economic indicators (i.e. a large U.S. merchandise trade deficit and a falling U.S. dollar, which seemed to imply future interest rate hikes).
Daisy Luther is the author of The Pantry Primer: A Prepper’s Guide To Whole Food on a Half Price Budget. Her website, The Organic Prepper, offers information on healthy prepping, including premium nutritional choices, general wellness and non-tech solutions. You can follow Daisy on Facebook and Twitter, and you can email her at firstname.lastname@example.org
The crash followed an asset bubble. Since 1922, the stock market had gone up by almost 20 percent a year. Everyone invested, thanks to a financial invention called buying "on margin." It allowed people to borrow money from their broker to buy stocks. They only needed to put down 10-20 percent. Investing this way contributed to the irrational exuberance of the Roaring Twenties.